Croatia resolves the hyperinflation by transforming the Central Bank to an exchange office, and that’s where the biggest problem started. Before 1994 the State emitted our money, the so-called Croatian dinar. After 1994, the Croatian kuna became our currency and for every kuna released into circulation, it was necessary to take a loan abroad. The kuna became a voucher for the Euro. So, if a national bank wants to give you a loan, it can’t get the kunas from the Central Bank to give them to you. First, our bank has to borrow Euros on a foreign market, then those euros are exchanged to kunas at the Croatian National Bank, and that’s why people who take a loan in kunas, have to sign a currency clause.”
This monetary policy, known as the quasi-fixed exchange rate, wasn’t new. It was first adopted by Thailand in the 1980s. The way it works is you tie your country’s official exchange rate to another country’s currency. In this case, Croatia tied it to the Euro. This creates the illusion of a fluctuating exchange rate, the illusion of a Croatian currency.
---> Ivan Pernar: “Our money is not even printed in Croatia, that’s a horrific bit of information. If you take the 10 kuna note, right below the Pula Arena, it says it’s produced by Giesecke & Devrient Germany. On the 20 kuna note, it says Giesecke & Devrient Germany, so it too is printed in Germany. The 50 kuna note, however, is printed in Austria, by CEBS Austria. The 1000 kuna note is also printed in Germany, and finally, the 100 kuna, by CEBS Austria.”
Makes you wonder who runs the show when it comes to the Croatian economy.
---> Ivan Pernar: “I asked the so-called Croatian National Bank why our national currency isn’t printed in Croatia. The answer was that it wasn’t profitable. Then I asked the essential question. If it’s not profitable in our country to print our money, then what kind of production is?”
Was this the Croatia that its first President Franjo Tuđman had promised to the people when it declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, triggering a bloody war that lasted four years? A high ranking official in Tuđman’s party, the Croatian Democratic Union, or HDZ, in the 1990s, Domagoj Margetić saw Tuđman’s project in a different light from how the Croatian media presented him.
---> Domagoj Margetic: “From the very beginning, Tudjman was hell bent on creating a rich Croatian elite, 200 rich families in Croatia. Of course, he only cared about his family and friends getting rich. On the other hand, Tudjman was, without a doubt, a warlord. The entire profit that Tudjman, his family and those 200 families made, is actually bloody money, acquired in criminal ways during the war. Before the 1990s they couldn’t even afford a cup of coffee, while after 1992, they were multimillionaires. “
This was the case in other countries as well during the Yugoslav wars and money seemed to be a higher interest than winning territories through war, which even brought some leaders on opposite sides of the conflict – together.
---> Domagoj Margetic: “How can one explain that Milosevic and Tudjman throughout the war period had at least three common banks abroad? They invested capital in them, kept their secret accounts there. Here is one example. Half of Franco-Yugoslav Bank in Paris was owned by the Croats, the other half by the Serbs, during the entire war. I found documents from Tudjman’s regime, written decisions, from 1993, about a recapitalization of the Franco-Yugoslav Bank in Paris. Do you know who the president of the Bank’s administration was at that time? The now deceased Bora Milosevic.”
Resultat (
svenska) 1:
[Kopia]Kopieras!
Croatia resolves the hyperinflation by transforming the Central Bank to an exchange office, and that’s where the biggest problem started. Before 1994 the State emitted our money, the so-called Croatian dinar. After 1994, the Croatian kuna became our currency and for every kuna released into circulation, it was necessary to take a loan abroad. The kuna became a voucher for the Euro. So, if a national bank wants to give you a loan, it can’t get the kunas from the Central Bank to give them to you. First, our bank has to borrow Euros on a foreign market, then those euros are exchanged to kunas at the Croatian National Bank, and that’s why people who take a loan in kunas, have to sign a currency clause.”This monetary policy, known as the quasi-fixed exchange rate, wasn’t new. It was first adopted by Thailand in the 1980s. The way it works is you tie your country’s official exchange rate to another country’s currency. In this case, Croatia tied it to the Euro. This creates the illusion of a fluctuating exchange rate, the illusion of a Croatian currency.---> Ivan Pernar: “Our money is not even printed in Croatia, that’s a horrific bit of information. If you take the 10 kuna note, right below the Pula Arena, it says it’s produced by Giesecke & Devrient Germany. On the 20 kuna note, it says Giesecke & Devrient Germany, so it too is printed in Germany. The 50 kuna note, however, is printed in Austria, by CEBS Austria. The 1000 kuna note is also printed in Germany, and finally, the 100 kuna, by CEBS Austria.”Makes you wonder who runs the show when it comes to the Croatian economy.---> Ivan Pernar: “I asked the so-called Croatian National Bank why our national currency isn’t printed in Croatia. The answer was that it wasn’t profitable. Then I asked the essential question. If it’s not profitable in our country to print our money, then what kind of production is?”Was this the Croatia that its first President Franjo Tuđman had promised to the people when it declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, triggering a bloody war that lasted four years? A high ranking official in Tuđman’s party, the Croatian Democratic Union, or HDZ, in the 1990s, Domagoj Margetić saw Tuđman’s project in a different light from how the Croatian media presented him.---> Domagoj Margetic: “From the very beginning, Tudjman was hell bent on creating a rich Croatian elite, 200 rich families in Croatia. Of course, he only cared about his family and friends getting rich. On the other hand, Tudjman was, without a doubt, a warlord. The entire profit that Tudjman, his family and those 200 families made, is actually bloody money, acquired in criminal ways during the war. Before the 1990s they couldn’t even afford a cup of coffee, while after 1992, they were multimillionaires. “This was the case in other countries as well during the Yugoslav wars and money seemed to be a higher interest than winning territories through war, which even brought some leaders on opposite sides of the conflict – together.---> Domagoj Margetic: “How can one explain that Milosevic and Tudjman throughout the war period had at least three common banks abroad? They invested capital in them, kept their secret accounts there. Here is one example. Half of Franco-Yugoslav Bank in Paris was owned by the Croats, the other half by the Serbs, during the entire war. I found documents from Tudjman’s regime, written decisions, from 1993, about a recapitalization of the Franco-Yugoslav Bank in Paris. Do you know who the president of the Bank’s administration was at that time? The now deceased Bora Milosevic.”
Omsätts, vänta..
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Resultat (
svenska) 2:
[Kopia]Kopieras!
Croatia resolves the hyperinflation by transforming the Central Bank to an exchange office, and that’s where the biggest problem started. Before 1994 the State emitted our money, the so-called Croatian dinar. After 1994, the Croatian kuna became our currency and for every kuna released into circulation, it was necessary to take a loan abroad. The kuna became a voucher for the Euro. So, if a national bank wants to give you a loan, it can’t get the kunas from the Central Bank to give them to you. First, our bank has to borrow Euros on a foreign market, then those euros are exchanged to kunas at the Croatian National Bank, and that’s why people who take a loan in kunas, have to sign a currency clause.”
This monetary policy, known as the quasi-fixed exchange rate, wasn’t new. It was first adopted by Thailand in the 1980s. The way it works is you tie your country’s official exchange rate to another country’s currency. In this case, Croatia tied it to the Euro. This creates the illusion of a fluctuating exchange rate, the illusion of a Croatian currency.
---> Ivan Pernar: “Our money is not even printed in Croatia, that’s a horrific bit of information. If you take the 10 kuna note, right below the Pula Arena, it says it’s produced by Giesecke & Devrient Germany. On the 20 kuna note, it says Giesecke & Devrient Germany, so it too is printed in Germany. The 50 kuna note, however, is printed in Austria, by CEBS Austria. The 1000 kuna note is also printed in Germany, and finally, the 100 kuna, by CEBS Austria.”
Makes you wonder who runs the show when it comes to the Croatian economy.
---> Ivan Pernar: “I asked the so-called Croatian National Bank why our national currency isn’t printed in Croatia. The answer was that it wasn’t profitable. Then I asked the essential question. If it’s not profitable in our country to print our money, then what kind of production is?”
Was this the Croatia that its first President Franjo Tuđman had promised to the people when it declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, triggering a bloody war that lasted four years? A high ranking official in Tuđman’s party, the Croatian Democratic Union, or HDZ, in the 1990s, Domagoj Margetić saw Tuđman’s project in a different light from how the Croatian media presented him.
---> Domagoj Margetic: “From the very beginning, Tudjman was hell bent on creating a rich Croatian elite, 200 rich families in Croatia. Of course, he only cared about his family and friends getting rich. On the other hand, Tudjman was, without a doubt, a warlord. The entire profit that Tudjman, his family and those 200 families made, is actually bloody money, acquired in criminal ways during the war. Before the 1990s they couldn’t even afford a cup of coffee, while after 1992, they were multimillionaires. “
This was the case in other countries as well during the Yugoslav wars and money seemed to be a higher interest than winning territories through war, which even brought some leaders on opposite sides of the conflict – together.
---> Domagoj Margetic: “How can one explain that Milosevic and Tudjman throughout the war period had at least three common banks abroad? They invested capital in them, kept their secret accounts there. Here is one example. Half of Franco-Yugoslav Bank in Paris was owned by the Croats, the other half by the Serbs, during the entire war. I found documents from Tudjman’s regime, written decisions, from 1993, about a recapitalization of the Franco-Yugoslav Bank in Paris. Do you know who the president of the Bank’s administration was at that time? The now deceased Bora Milosevic.”
Omsätts, vänta..
